Dhruva Jaishankar is executive director of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) America and also a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Australia. Previously, he was a fellow at Brookings India in New Delhi, the Brookings Institution in Washington DC and a transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund (GMF) in Washington DC. He was associated with several other institutions such as the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, Aspen Strategy Group and others. Nepalkhabar talked to Jaishankar on India-US ties, recently. Excerpts:
How have India-US ties evolved since Prime Minister Modi came to power? How is it different from the former government?
In some sense, the Modi government in 2014 picked up where the first term of the Congress-led coalition government -- known as UPA 1 from 2004-2009 - left off. By this, I mean that in these periods India consciously sought a broader and deeper partnership with the United States, encompassing security, economic, and social ties. Some of the newer developments have included the Major Defense Partnership in 2015, the revitalization of the QUAD after 2017, and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework more recently, but some of the more significant elements of the partnership have been more mundane but no less important including in science, technology, and health. By contrast, there was a period of time in between roughly 2008 or 2009 to 2014 when India-US relations remained somewhat stuck. It was often defined by irritants, and I sense that this was due to a combination of US political priorities under Obama, politics and decisions made by the government of the day in India, and larger structural changes, such as the global financial crisis of 2008-09.
India is holding the G20 summit this year. Given the India-US relations are multi-sectoral and broad based, how do you see the joint effort on climate change and environment front coming up between the two countries?
Energy and climate issues are a top priority for both the US and Indian governments at the moment. There are challenges less on the philosophical level than on practical cooperation. How do you accelerate the adoption of green technologies, particularly in the developing world? Who pays for costly energy transitions? The US and European countries want emerging economies to shoulder a greater burden, and a lot of the intellectual property and research are in private hands. So, while there is a broad-based agreement on the necessity and urgency of the issue, there remain many practical hurdles between the developed and developing worlds. The US-India conversation seems stuck in a cycle where the US government says, “you should do more on climate,” India says “we are already doing a lot and want to do more but you can help with technology and financing,” and the US government responds with “well, we can’t because that’s in the private sector’s hands.” And then you’re at a standstill. What a lot of people are now doing – including at my organization – is trying to find ways to break this cycle.
The recent statement by US treasury secretary Janet Yellen called for a deepening of US-India ties and emphasized the importance of “friend-shoring”. Could you list a few areas we could focus on?
A combination of factors – China’s dominance of supply chains, US-China tensions, the Russia-Ukraine war, and perhaps most importantly the Covid-19 pandemic – have been disruptive enough to lead to a general rethink about globally dispersed supply chains, particularly for products deemed vital to the economy or national security. This has led to a broader trend of countries attempting to reshore production of certain critical goods or, if that is not viable, diverting supply chains to friendly countries, or ‘friend-shoring.’ This process is already underway, but it is uneven. The US has decided for example to offer heavy subsidies for semiconductor and green energy production. India, too, has used what is caused a production linked incentive (PLI) scheme to incentivize manufacturing of certain critical goods. In some cases, given the wealth disparity between the US and India, these steps can be complementary. The trend will probably be felt most in areas like health products, critical metals and minerals, technological components and electronics, and renewable energy.
Has India’s approach to the Ukraine crisis promoted a change in the US’s foreign policy towards India?
India’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war has not adversely affected India-US relations in any meaningful way, at least not at the official level. There has been a significant level of understanding, at least at the senior levels of the US government, about India’s position. For example, Under Secretary of State Toria Nuland, known for being something of a Russia hawk, actually spoke of needing to help India with its defense industrial spares when she visited Delhi in mid-2022. As the war has become prolonged, the US has started to think even longer-term. For example, it is now well appreciated that India’s purchasing of Russian oil is helping to keep commodity prices lower, and in the long-run will help Europe diversify its energy sources away from Russia. India is also seen as being an important builder of consensus, as at the G20 Summit in Bali or in negotiating certain small-scale agreements. However, the wider US strategic community and media, particularly those with a traditional Europe focus, is not necessarily up to speed on this and in many quarters continue to mischaracterize India’s Russia policy.
How will the India-US relationship develop in the context of American interest in Taiwan?
The US has a particular legacy and set of interests when it comes to Taiwan. India does not have either those obligations or old policies, so it is strange to sometimes see analysts automatically transpose a US approach to Taiwan on India. In the event of cross-Strait hostilities, US involvement will be considerable, and that would automatically involve Japan as well, something for which the leadership in Tokyo is already preparing. India has its own dispute with China on land, but also interests when it comes to Taiwan as well as broader concerns about security, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific. Today there is sufficient trust between India and the US to have frank conversations on these developments, and share their perspectives. But I do often stress the need to be realistic about what obligations, interests, and actions are going to take priority.
The growing defense cooperation between India and the United States is considered to be the brightest spot on the tapestry of bilateral relations. However, formulating a systematized game plan for technology transfer is yet to be made concrete. How can India and the US overcome the bureaucratic bottlenecks that impede their technology cooperation?
There are a lot of misconceptions on this score. The first is that transfer of technology is in fact taking place, although this is mostly between private companies in the United States and India, rather than between the two governments or government-affiliated entities. The challenge on the government-to-government track is largely in the design of the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), where few possible projects meet both countries’ criteria. Another misconception is that technology denials by the US are the major obstacles. Certainly, there are some confounding bureaucratic bottlenecks -- as even Australia is finding with nuclear submarine technology -- but that is no longer the primary obstacle. Instead, consistent and timely orders at scale in India are inhibiting long-term investment in the development of a defense industrial ecosystem that is capable of absorbing technology. Again, there are some notable successes around the margins, but the challenge is in making it systematic and at scale. I’m actually cautiously optimistic on this score, but it will take time and is already happening in some less eye-catching areas, such as in military vehicles.
In light of the tension between India and China recently, we saw India and the US hold a joint military exercise along India’s Himalayan border with China. In this context how do you see the ties between the two countries going forward in defense security as well as the economic front?
Defense and security ties between the US and India are today extraordinarily broad-based. India today is the United States’ most important military partner outside its alliance network, and this is reflected in regular dialogues and engagement at the senior levels, as well as a range of working groups, intelligence cooperation, and regular military exercises. The US is getting used to what it is like to have a broad and productive security partnership with a non-ally, something it hasn’t really done since before World War II. India is learning how to develop a partnership of equals with a global power, something it hasn’t done since independence. So, it remains an area full of possibilities, but the broader trajectory is promising.
There hasn’t been any maritime conflict between China and India. How can India respond to the US’s position on the Indo-Pacific if it wishes to pursue inclusive institutionalism with China in the region?
Regarding the lack of India-China conflict in the maritime domain, it can largely be attributed to the fact that China has only been active in waters it does not claim as territorial since 2008 -- less than fifteen years. But severe maritime competition between China and India is already a reality. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is in the process of one of the largest naval build-ups in history. Given the presence of the United States, Japan, and Taiwan, the PLAN will remain constrained in the Western Pacific short of major conflict, and following the militarization of the South China Sea, we are already seeing greater Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean. China’s first overseas military base is in Djibouti -- west of India – and several other Chinese developments are potentially dual use. India has the largest resident navy in the Indian Ocean but is obviously concerned about greater competition from China, particularly in the absence of transparency. All this is a way of saying that India’s focus on maritime security is by no means at the behest of the United States or any other actor. However, the fact that the US has similar concerns in other parts of the Indo-Pacific also opens the room for collaboration.
Concerning inclusive institutionalism, what is often overlooked in India’s calls is New Delhi’s request that all actors abide by a set of norms or principles; just read Prime Minister Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue (which, unfortunately, many Indian analysts misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented). When you see what China has done in violation of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the South China Sea and its illegal fishing activities, it is obvious that India will need to cooperate with other countries in the Indo-Pacific – and not just the United States – to ensure that China abides by the rules and norms that most other countries abide by as well. There’s much more commonality – even if there is not and is unlikely to be complete congruence – between Indian and US visions of the Indo-Pacific, and that has been reflected in a succession of joint statements.
