Amidst widespread media speculation over a potential strong retaliatory move by the Modi government against Pakistan in the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, the political landscape in New Delhi took an unexpected turn. Instead of responding militarily, the government surprised many by announcing a caste enumeration in the upcoming census, a vital demand that the opposition, especially Rahul Gandhi, had been pushing rigorously for four years.
The move was ironic and dramatic. A caste census, as previously suggested by many BJP leaders, could destroy the cohesive Hindu identity, backbone of hindutva politics. Soon after the attack in Pahalgam, far right social media handles including that of Chhattisgarh BJP started sharing social media posts like ‘Unhone dharm pucha jati nahi (terrorists asked anout religion not caste’ and ‘they paid the price for being Hindu.’ Their main emphasis was on the need for religious unity in the fight against terrorism.
Hindutva politics has long been uncomfortable with caste based social justice discourse and is still struggling to co-exist with it. In the past, BJP had an ambiguous stand over the question of caste census. BJP senior leaders including J.P. Nadda, Yogi Adityanath, Nitin Gadkari, Anurag Thakur, and Smriti Irani dismissed the opposition campaign of the caste census on multiple occasions; even Modi himself cited it as a sin, an urban Naxal idea and said that there are only four castes: ‘poor, youth, women, and farmer’.
On September 23, 2021, the Modi government stated that a caste census that went beyond Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs/STs) was administratively unfeasible. However, Janata Dal United, JD (U), led by Nitish Kumar (now a political ally of the BJP government), is among the first to urge the government to reconsider its decision.
Was the announcement after Pahalgam a coincidence or a calculated move?
The Modi government had announced a caste census in the immediate aftermath of the Pahalgam attack. Was it merely a coincidence, a strategic decision, or the result of deeper political calculations?
At first glance, it might seem like a strange timing. Post-Pahalgam, anti-Muslim sentiments were at a peak. Indians were waiting for a strong military retaliation, and Modi was at the center of public expectation. There was little criticism of the BJP; almost all key opposition leaders publicly expressed solidarity with the government and promised support for any decision it would take.
The government appeared to be preparing for a tough response. The suspension of the Indus Water Treaty raised public hopes further, and news headlines declared that the army had been given a free hand. For Modi, it was an ideal moment to reinforce trust and project the party’s image as a committed defender of national security. This is what Modi had successfully done after the surgical strikes following Pulwama and Uri. Once again, time was to strengthen the government’s nationalist credentials. And it is very likely that some form of military retaliation may still be on the cards. If that doesn't happen, caste census or not, even core supporters of BJP might begin to question the leadership.
But then, why announcement of the caste census now?
Point is, the decision was not taken enthusiastically, but it had become unavoidable, reasons for which have been discussed subsequently in this piece. What’s important to understand first is that the government didn’t have unlimited freedom to make such a socially sensitive move at any random time.
The history of social reform through a political channel in India, particularly those involving affirmative action, shows that such decisions often face fierce resistance from well-connected, dominant-caste groups. The violent backlash to the Mandal Commission reforms that led to 27% reservations for Other backward classes, is the clearest example. Governments must therefore be extremely cautious about timing, especially when fear of backlash comes from their own core supporters.
The public mood Post-Pahalgam was heavily tilted in favor of national security. Core supporters of the BJP were charged with nationalistic and communal sentiment. The media’s focus had shifted entirely to the possibility of military retaliation.
Even as criticism of the caste census grew, the government used 'Operation Sindoor' against Pakistan to overshadow dissent and regain control of the narrative. In such a charged environment, the announcement of the caste census could pass—if not entirely unnoticed—at least without sparking violent resistance.
Why was a caste census inevitable?
Most people agree that Indian society has long been organized around caste structures and caste identities. Some argue that caste is disappearing, but as Rajani Kothari argues, no social system vanishes like that. It would be more accurate to say that caste is changing its form within today’s political landscape.
Caste consciousness, an awareness of caste as a form of discrimination, has grown significantly among backward classes and Dalit communities in India, due to past affirmative actions, rising literacy rates, and the sustained efforts of Dalit activists. This consciousness is reflected in their increasing visibility, social mobilization, and capacity to influence political mandates.
This growing awareness has reshaped—and continues to reshape—the political spectrum in India. It has given rise to parties that found success through what is often called Bahujan politics. It is not just the BJP that has had to reconsider its position; even the Congress party, which for a long time after independence tried to ignore the fundamental caste divisions in Indian society, kept such concerns largely out of its politics.
The UPA-II government, led by the Indian National Congress, did agree to conduct a caste census, and caste data were collected in the 2011 census. However, that data was never made public. Yet, as leading figures in both the previous and current governments, Rahul Gandhi and Narendra Modi are likely to have access to that data. Given Rahul Gandhi’s sustained advocacy for Lohiaite principles—particularly equitable representation for OBCs, Dalits, and Adivasis—the caste census’s social demography could significantly bolster political narratives centered on marginalized rights. Unsurprisingly, Modi, recognizing this potential shift, is unwilling to relinquish control over what may emerge as a defining axis of Indian politics.
So, will the BJP be the new voice of Dalits?
While society shapes politics, politics also tries to shape society. The BJP, along with its ideological parent RSS, has been working hard to influence the narrative of Bahujan politics. Their main strategy in dealing with politics that differs from theirs is to homogenize identities under the larger Hindu fold by appropriating beliefs, symbols, and historical figures to suit their version of History.
This is precisely what the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a right-wing, Hindu nationalist organization in India, founded in 1925, has done, and continues to do, with Adivasis. They try to convince or pressure them to believe that they are Hindus, that their distinct cultures are part of Hindu identity, and that figures like Birsa Munda are to be worshipped as ‘Bhagwan’. A similar effort has been underway in recent years with B.R. Ambedkar. The BJP has constructed the Panchteerth, five symbolic sites to honor Ambedkar, presenting him as a kind of Dalit deity. But this reverence is largely symbolic. There’s a growing trend of misreading and misquoting Ambedkar, attempting to align his thought with the ideology of Savarkar. It’s the kind of selective respect that says: “I won’t follow your ideas or intentions, but I will display your photo everywhere.”
The caste census decision by the BJP should not be overestimated as a sign of genuine commitment to the voices of the oppressed. There were clear immediate pressures: a persistent and growing campaign for the caste census led by the opposition; caste-based surveys already conducted in Bihar, Telangana, and Karnataka; and rising discomfort within BJP circles over the credibility of these surveys. Key allies like Nitish Kumar and Chirag Paswan were in favor of this move. And, for the first time in history, the national census was delayed for five years — a delay the BJP could no longer justify, especially with delimitation and the implementation of the women’s reservation bill on the horizon.
Most importantly, we must remember: a caste census in itself is neither good nor bad. It is simply data. Its real value depends on how it is used--whether it enables a socio-economic audit of the country’s resources and informs socially just, caste-conscious policymaking to break the cycle of caste-blind politics.
Given how frequently Indian political institutions have betrayed Bahujan aspirations, it is not only reasonable but necessary to view this decision with suspicion — if not of the decision itself, then at least of the intent behind it.
One of the BJP’s core strategies across India has been to mobilize other caste groups against dominant caste within the OBC, SC, and ST categories. Favoring anti-Jat sentiment in Haryana and Rajasthan, anti-Meena sentiment in Rajasthan, and anti-Yadav sentiment in UP and Bihar are the examples.
The upcoming caste census data, too, can be used to serve narrow political interests. And unless society’s stakeholders remain vigilant, that data may end up reinforcing discrimination rather than correcting injustices.
In a nutshell, data alone does not guarantee justice. What matters is who interprets it, who controls the narrative, and whose interests it ultimately serves. The real struggle begins after the numbers are out.
(Mr Narendra Thapa is a lecturer of Development Practices and Sociology at Xavier International College, Kathmandu and Mr Rahul Yadav is a research scholar at National Institute of Technology, Jaipur.)
.
