The debate on the future of US-China relations is getting more intense every day. Along with the increasing recognition of the bipolar nature of the international system, recent events in the Taiwan strait and Eastern Europe have further amplified the debate. The dominant view is that a US-China war is imminent, with Taiwan acting as a flash for fire. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there have been worries that China will follow the same path and execute the long-standing desire for the reunification of Taiwan.
However, even after seven months of the Ukrainian crisis, nothing significant has happened on the Taiwan front. Although China supported Russia in the UN and refused to put sanctions, it has maintained a consistent position of respecting sovereignty. The Chinese foreign minister met the Ukrainian counterpart after Russia’s partial mobilization, which shows China is distancing itself from Russia. The recent SCO summit also highlighted limits on how far China will go to support Russian actions. It does not want to be seen directly supporting the destruction of Westphalian norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Though China views Taiwan as a thorn in its regional ambitions, it still does not see itself in a position to risk a direct confrontation with the US. There are a few reasons why China will not follow Russia and continue to resist the temptations of forcefully integrating Taiwan anytime soon.
First, as Ali Wyne highlights, Russia has not seen a comparable integration into the globalized world system as China’s share of global trade is nearly 15 percent, (according to 2021 data) whereas Russia’s contribution is merely 1.7 percent. Thus, China has much to lose from a confrontation with the United States and other important players of the same system.
Second, the existence of the Taiwan Relations Act marks a crucial difference between Taiwan and Ukraine. Under the Act, the US provides arms of defensive character to Taiwan and maintains the United States’ capacity to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardise the security or social or economic system of the people of Taiwan”. Ukraine lacks any similar backing from the US and NATO. Although the Budapest memorandum provided “security assurance” to Ukraine, it does not bind the US and the other agreement members to a specific countermeasure.
Third, there is a difference between the operational military experience of Russia and China. Russia has had many military (mis)adventures in the past, which include cold war conflicts, a proxy war in Syria, and, more recently, the annexation of Crimea. These precedents significantly increase Russia’s propensity to wage war in pursuit of its political goals. Conversely, China hasn’t been militarily involved in any large-scale conflict since the Vietnam war. The fight to reunify Taiwan cannot be won just by the usual salami-slicing tactics or the grey-zone operations.
Some scholars have argued that a successful invasion and integration of Taiwan will breach the first island chain providing immense geostrategic advantages to China. It would limit the US naval forces’ ability to operate in the region. However, this thesis ignores the costs involved in the process. There is a discord between what China holds ideal and what is practicable in the current situation. Not only would China not appreciate the prospect of a unified but war-torn and deserted Taiwan, a full-fledged war with the US will spell disaster for the Chinese economy. The Chinese industrial base and financial centres are primarily located along the coast: the region most likely to be drawn into war.
Also, any such invasion will severely damage the capabilities of the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force in terms of assets and platforms. It will significantly impede China’s progress towards expanding global power projection capabilities to secure Chinese footprints across the continents. Hence, the stakes for China are higher than the predictions analysts make of a US-China warfare.
In most discussions on the US-China conflict over Taiwan, there is almost a complete neglect of Taiwan’s public opinion. Surveys show that only 5 percent of Taiwanese favour ‘independence as soon as possible’, and the majority population are in favour of maintaining the status quo. Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), considered more nationalistic and critical of China than the other major party, also advocate maintaining the status quo. During the 100th anniversary of the formation of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and in the recent 20th National Congress of Communist Party of China, President Xi emphasized that China will oppose any act aimed at the ‘independence of Taiwan’. Though one should not take China’s statement of having strategic patience at face value, Xi’s statement on Taiwan was not harsher than his previous positions. Therefore, the immediate threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan might be an exaggeration.
Like Putin, even if Xi considers Taiwan reunification in his personal interest instead of rational calculations of national costs and benefits, invasion is risky. Since Ukraine’s invasion, a new race has emerged to succeed Putin, whose position has been hitherto unchallenged. Public opinion is turning against Putin, and people are coming out and protesting against the war. If Xi aims to build his legacy like Mao in China, he will be averse to an invasion unless the imbalance of power is such that success is guaranteed.
Thus, a US-China war over Taiwan is a hasty conclusion; it is not as imminent as scholars are making it. Instead, the anxiety among scholars and policymakers might lead to an escalating spiral of miscalculations and misperceptions. It risks blocking up the diplomatic avenues and communications, thereby disturbing the very stability across the strait they intend to uphold. In the end, Taiwanese people will lose the most, irrespective of the outcome of a US-China war over Taiwan.
(Alka Verma is master’s student at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)
